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1 Corrupt Practices in the Construction Industry: 
A Survey of Ghanaian Experience  
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Owusu-Manu De-Graft 3, Edwards D. John4, and  
3 Amos Darko5 
4 
5 ABSTRACT  
6 Globally, corruption presents a major risk that reduces construction project performance by inflating  
7 costs and reducing the quality of infrastructure commissioned. In developing countries, corruption 8 
stifles economic development and engenders social inequality. This paper uncovers the prevalence and 
9 forms of corrupt practices within the developing country of Ghana using a structured questionnaire  
10 survey to elicit direct knowledge and lived experiences of construction practitioners. Research findings 
11 illustrate that habitual corruption and unethical behaviour prevails amongst public officials, contractors 
12 and construction professionals during the bid evaluation, tendering and contract implementation stages 
13 of a construction contract. This research proffers that corruption is driven by a toxic concoction of 
high  
14 political connections, excessive and reckless sole sourcing of public construction projects, lack of  
15 commitment by construction companies to address corruption and the inherently idiosyncratic  
16 operational environment of the construction sector. The top-five forms of corruption frequently  
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17 encountered, in descending order, are kickbacks (extortion), bribery, collusion and tender rigging,  
18 conflict of interest and fraud. The research presents a rare glimpse of construction industry corruption  
19 in a developing country and provides polemic clarity geared to intellectually challenge readers in 20 
government and industry. Future work is required to explore and develop appropriate countermeasures  
 21  to address the corrupt practices and behaviours.   
  22  Keywords: Corruption, kickbacks, bribery, construction industry, developing country 
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INTRODUCTION  22 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2008) defined corruption as: “the misuse 23 
of entrusted power for private gain.” Corruption represents a major and persistent obstacle to 24 
governments and businesses that seek to achieve sustainable social and economic development 25 
(Pillay 2004; World Bank 1997). According to the World Economic Forum et al.  26 
(2012), corruption accounts for ≥ 5% of the world’s gross domestic product, which translates 27 
into some US$2.6 trillion, with over US$1 trillion paid in bribes annually. The construction 28 
sector in particular has been described as an inherently dishonest industry (Transparency 29 
International 2005, 2011, 2013) and corrupt practices occur at all stakeholder levels and phases 30 
of project development (Brown and Skitmore 2015; de Jong et al. 2009; Shakantu 2006). These 31 
malpractices include fraud, fronting, bribery, kickbacks, conflict of interest, collusion and 32 
bidrigging, nepotism and other unfair/ unethical conducts (Brown and Skitmore 2015; Le et al.  33 
2014; Bowen et al. 2012; Tabish and Jha 2011; Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore 2000; Sohail and 34 
Cavill 2008). The repercussions of corruption include stifled economic development, absence 35 
of competition in prices and quality and poor workmanship (Sohail and Cavill 2008; Uneke  36 
2010). The industry’s susceptibility to corruption is attributed to its inherently idiosyncratic 37 
characteristics such as: the size, uniqueness and complexity of constructed products; lengthy 38 
and sophisticated construction processes; fragmented structure with multiple contractual 39 
relationships; adversarial culture; and poor professional ethical standards (Sohail and Cavill 40 
2008; Transparency International 2013; Shan et al. 2015).   41 
  42 
The parlous state of developing countries demands effective and efficient construction outputs 43 
to initiate affordable housing and infrastructure to fuel economic growth and circumvent 44 
poverty; yet paradoxically such countries are most vulnerable to corruption (Fanteye 2004). Le 45 
et al. (2014) recommended more empirical research should be commissioned within  46 
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developing countries that are challenged with addressing corruption. Their review (ibid) of 56 47 
pertinent published articles between 1990 and 2012 revealed that more empirical research is 48 
needed to investigate corrupt practices in developing countries. The nature and extent of corrupt 49 
practices varies across countries, owing to differences in maturity and/ or availability of 50 
effective procurement structures and, regulatory and administrative systems (Le et al. 2014;  51 
Heywood and Rose 2014; Sampford et al. 2006; Shakantu and Chiocha 2009). Shan et al. 52 
(2015) reinforces this assertion, reporting that tenuous regulatory structures – underpinned by 53 
inadequate sanctions and negative leadership – have a strong effect on corruption 54 
vulnerabilities. Within the developing country of Ghana, widespread dishonest practices 55 
amongst public and government officials has engendered public disquiet (World Bank 56 
Enterprise Surveys 2013; CDD-Ghana 2000; Mensah et al. 2003). In response, the government 57 
enacted the Public Procurement Act in 2003 (i.e., Act 663) to reform and regulate public works 58 
procurement and combat corruption (Government of Ghana 2003). However, despite the Act 59 
633, corruption remains an importunate and unrelenting issue (Osei-Tutu et al. 2010), for 60 
example, Ameer (2015) recently reported that contractors pay 10–20% of the tender sum in 61 
bribes to secure public contracts. Ghana has not improved its scores on the Transparency 62 
International’s (TI) corruption index and has consistently fallen below the midpoint of TI’s 63 
scale of 0 (highly corrupt) and 100 (very clean). Figure 1 shows Ghana’s ranks and scores on 64 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) between 2007 and 2016. The country is described as the 65 
second worst decliner in the 2016 CPI in the Sub-Saharan region, scoring 43 (equivalent to the 66 
global average) on the index. These scores indicate pervasive corruption in Ghana’s public 67 
sector (Transparency International 2016).    68 
  69 
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[Insert Figure 1 around here]  70 
Against this background, an empirical investigation of corruption in public infrastructure works 71 
procurement is conducted in Ghana. Specifically, the research reports upon the personal 72 
experiences of construction practitioners regarding the extent and nature of corruption. This 73 
research will assist policy makers to develop workable anti-corruption strategies that are 74 
formulated upon a cogent understanding of the extent and nature of this omnipresent problem.   75 
  76 
LITERATURE REVIEW  77 
Corruption and the Construction Industry  78 
The Chartered Institute of Building’s (CIOB 2006) construction industry-wide survey indicated 79 
that there was no clear and commonly accepted definition of ‘corruption’ within the UK 80 
construction industry. Indeed, results showed that the respondents held conflicting perceptions 81 
as to what constitutes corruption. Hence, for this study corruption is defined as the: “offering, 82 
giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly anything of value to influence the action of 83 
an official in the procurement or selection process or in [construction] contract execution” 84 
(United Nations 2006). Within construction literature, various research studies have 85 
investigated corruption and ethics.  In the UK, the Charted Institute of Building (CIOB 2006) 86 
found that 51% of the 1,404 practitioners had direct experiences of corruption and that on at 87 
least one occasion, 41% of the respondents had been offered bribes. The study found that 88 
corruption is “present in many aspects of the UK construction industry” (pg. 3) and 89 
recommended that industry and government must do more to eliminate corruption. In response, 90 
the UK government introduced the Bribery Act 2010 (with effect from April 2011) which 91 
requires construction firms to demonstrate their commitment to battling corruption (Bribery 92 
Act 2010; Donohoe 2011). The Bribery Act is extra-territorial and holds senior officials of 93 
companies liable for not fighting corruption.  94 
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  95 
In South Africa, Bowen et al. (2012) surveyed the views and experiences of construction 96 
practitioners and clients. They concluded that corruption is pervasive and that contractors, 97 
subcontractors and public officials are actively implicated in such practice; this finding 98 
concurred with the earlier work of Zou (2006). Government officials frequently engage in 99 
nepotism, dishonesty and unfairness, tender irregularities, and extortion of bribes/kickbacks 100 
whilst architects and engineers are guilty of negligence and financial maladministration (Zou 101 
2006; Bowen et al. 2007b). In Australia, May et al. (2000) revealed that bid cutting amongst 102 
main contractors and subcontractors is widely practiced; however, whilst main contractors 103 
regarded bid cutting as perfectly ethical, subcontractors vehemently disagreed. Zarkada-Fraser 104 
and Skitmore (2000) investigated Australian construction professionals’ attitudes towards 105 
collusive tendering. Three major collusive tendering practices were identified (ibid), namely 106 
submission of cover prices, inflation of tender prices and withdrawal from the tendering 107 
process. Similarly, Vee and Skitmore (2003) surveyed the views and personal experiences of 108 
Australian construction professionals on industry ethics and found that all respondents had 109 
experienced or witnessed corrupt or unethical behaviour. Most recently, Brown and Skitmore’s 110 
(2015) exploratory study found that corruption was widespread in the Australian construction 111 
sector and was attributed to personal reward.   112 
  113 
Elsewhere, Tabish and Jah (2011, 2012) studied corruption in public construction project 114 
procurement in India and hypothesized that anti-corruption strategies eradicate corruption. In 115 
the United States (US), a survey found that 84% of the responding construction professionals 116 
have experienced corrupt acts or transactions (FMI/CMAA 2004). Chotibhongs and Arditi 117 
(2012) confirmed the existence of collusive bidding in the US and revealed that five out of 80 118 
bidders were jointly awarded 72% of the contracts, and identified a widespread use of cartel 119 
bidders. Similarly, Bajari (2001) observed bid-rigging in paving, school construction and 120 
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bridge repair projects in New York City and Chicago. From the industrial organisational theory 121 
perspective, Dorée (2004) discussed the problem of collusion in response to an extensive use 122 
of cartels and structural bid-rigging in the Dutch construction industry. Dorée (ibid) linked this 123 
persistent malpractice to the Dutch culture, improper market functioning and changes in 124 
antitrust legislation.   125 
  126 
This synthesis of extant literature illustrates that corruption is a persistent and endemic issue 127 
within the construction industry internationally. Indeed, corruption is so pervasive and 128 
entrenched that it permeates both process and professionalism.   129 
  130 
Forms of Corruption    131 
Corrupt and unethical practices within the construction industry exist in many guises and 132 
include: bribery (Gordon and Miyake 2001; Amundsen 2000); fraud (Tabish and Jha 2011; 133 
Vee and Skitmore 2003; United Nations 2006); kickbacks (Sohail and Cavil 2008; Osei-Tutu 134 
et al. 2010; Aluutu 2007); collusive tendering and bid rigging (Chotibhongs and Arditi 2012; 135 
Dorée 2004; Bajari 2001); embezzlement (Hartley 2009); conflict of interest (Brown and 136 
Skitmore 2015; Bowen et al. 2007b; Osei-Tutu et al. 2010; Vee and Skitmore 2003); and 137 
fronting (Le et al. 2014; de Jong et al. 2009).   138 
  139 
• Bribery is widespread in developing countries and whilst difficult to define, it includes 140 
speed and grease money (payments), gifts and gratuities, hospitability and the use of 141 
intermediaries (Gordon and Miyake 2001; Amundsen 2000).   142 
• Fraud is an economic crime involving acts such as swindle, trickery, misinformation or 143 
deceit (Tabish and Jha 2011; Vee and Skitmore 2003). Fraud represents a false 144 
misrepresentation or concealment of facts for commercial gain (United Nations 2006).   145 
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• Kickbacks are illicit economic incentives used to obtain a favourable decision from a 146 
person in a position of power, for example, in contractor selection (Aluutu 2007; Sohail 147 
and Cavil 2008; Osei-Tutu et al. 2010). Kickbacks typically inflate the cost of 148 
construction but rarely the quality (Aluutu 2007).   149 
• Collusive tendering and bid-rigging refers to a “secret agreement between two or more 150 
parties for a fraudulent” reason (Le et al. 2014). Collusive tendering includes 151 
compensation of unsuccessful bidders, cover pricing, hidden fees and bid cutting  152 
(Chotibhongs and Arditi 2012; Dorée 2004; Bowen et al. 2007a; Zarkada and Skitmore 153 
2000; Bajari 2001). Bid-rigging occurs between the tenderer and the tenderee where the 154 
former creates constraints that elevates the preferred tenderee to win a contract (Le et al. 155 
2014).   156 
• Embezzlement occurs when an official (with the client’s organisation) misappropriates or 157 
intentionally misuses project funds for personal rewards or political gain (Hartley 2009). 158 
Repercussions of embezzlement include unfinished projects, delayed or non-payment of 159 
contractors and suppliers, and below-standard workmanship.   160 
• Conflict of interest is frequently cited in construction procurement (Brown and Skitmore 161 
2015; Bowen et al. 2007b; Osei-Tutu et al. 2010; Le et al. 2014; Vee and Skitmore 2003) 162 
and is defined as a clash between the interest of the client organisation and personal 163 
interest of the client organisation’s official (United Nations 2006).   164 
• Fronting occurs when officials within government agencies or client organisations create 165 
front companies to obtain construction contracts. Front companies obtain unfair or illegal 166 
benefits in awarding public contracts because of their owners’ powerful positions in 167 
government (de Jong et al. 2009; Bowen et al. 2007a). These contracts are subsequently 168 
delegated to other construction firms for personal gains.           169 
  170 
RESEARCH METHODS  171 
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Questionnaire Survey  172 
A questionnaire survey conducted sought to solicit views and personal experiences of 173 
construction practitioners regarding: the extent and forms of corruption; participation in 174 
corruption; causal factors of corrupt acts; and measures needed to fight corruption. This data 175 
collection method was used because it provides valid and reliable information about the 176 
respondents’ experiences and knowledge of corruption at a reasonable cost (Hoxley 2008). 177 
Questionnaire surveys can also ensure anonymity of respondents when researching into 178 
sensitive topics such as corruption. The questionnaire design was adopted from Bowen et al. 179 
(2012) but with some modification to suit the current research. The questionnaire comprised of 180 
closed and forced-choice, declarative, multiple-choice and dichotomous questions to elicit the 181 
respondents’ experience and views. The responses were captured using five-point grading  182 
scales.   183 
  184 
Survey Participants   185 
The survey was conducted with practising quantity surveyors, architects, engineers and project/ 186 
construction managers from public agencies that sponsor construction projects and construction 187 
and consultancy firms that work for public clients. A selection exercise was first conducted to 188 
select a panel of practitioners who: i) are members of a construction industry professional body; 189 
ii) hold director and other senior management level positions in the public and private sectors; 190 
iii) have more than 10 years working experience in the construction industry; and iv) have 191 
personal experience of corruption. In order to avoid bias in the survey responses, respondents 192 
were selected from private construction companies, professional consulting firms and public 193 
sector agencies/departments (refer to Table 1). This selection strategy was adopted to secure 194 
quality respondents and to guarantee credible and balanced feedback. The selection exercise 195 
yielded thirty-five practising construction professionals from public and private organisations 196 
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who participated in the questionnaire survey; thirty-four are members of the main industry 197 
professional bodies, namely: Ghana Institution of Surveyors (GhIS); Ghana Institution of 198 
Engineers (GhIE); and Ghana Institute of Architects (GIA).   199 
  200 
Given the contextual sensitivity of corruption, acquiring a larger sample size is problematic 201 
(Brown and Skitmore 2015; Tabish and Jha 2011). Indeed, respondents were initially 202 
concerned with preserving their anonymity and preventing reprisal. To alleviate these concerns, 203 
ethical control measures were implemented and respondents were: given an opportunity to 204 
withdraw from the survey at any stage in the process; given assurances that all data would 205 
remain strictly confidential and would be securely disposed of post survey analysis; and 206 
informed that their personal details would be omitted from the questionnaire. These ethical 207 
control measures ensured that the sample size compared favourably with previous studies; for 208 
example, Vee and Skitmore’s (2003) and Brown and Skitmore’s (2015) surveys were based on 209 
responses of 31 and 23 respondents, respectively whilst Tabish and Jha’s (2011) findings were 210 
based on six respondents. Therefore, the sample size is considered to be sufficient.  211 
  212 
[Insert Table 1 around here]  213 
  214 
THE SURVEY RESULTS  215 
Survey results were analysed using descriptive statistics including mean, relative significance 216 
and standard deviation. The mean and relative index were applied as consensus approaches 217 
(Murphy et al. 2105; Jannadi 1996). The results are structured to iteratively report upon key 218 
sections of data collected from the questionnaires, namely: prevalence and forms of corruption; 219 
participation in corruption; facilitators of corruption; and control of corruption.    220 
  221 
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Prevalence and Forms of Corruption  222 
Overall, 97% of the survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that corruption is widespread, 223 
with a mean level of agreement of 4.40 (refer to Table 2). This result reinforces TI’s corruption 224 
index findings on Ghana, which indicate that the country declined in the 2016 CPI to a score 225 
of 43 from 47 in 2015. As shown in Figure 1, between 2007 and 2016, Ghana’s scores on the 226 
corruption index range between 37 and 48, below the midpoint of the scale. When requested to 227 
indicate on a five-point scale the project stages during which they have experienced or observed 228 
various corrupt activities, the respondents overwhelmingly indicated the tendering and bid 229 
evaluation phases, with high frequency indexes of 0.85 (mean = 4.25) and 0.86 (mean = 4.31), 230 
respectively. The tendering and bid evaluation phases are critical in construction contracts, 231 
ranging from invitation to tenders to contracts award. According to European Union (2013), 232 
direct losses resulting from corruption during the tendering process for rail and road transport 233 
construction and urban and utility construction in Europe is estimated at 17% and 20% of 234 
procurement cost respectively. The findings suggest that public officials within client 235 
departments exert influence upon the tender process (tenders and tender results) for personal 236 
reward or political gain. As indicated by Tullock (2001), decision makers favour an individual 237 
construction firm, for example, through a reduction in the number of bidders. Corruption during 238 
tendering and bid evaluation processes mean that tenders are deemed non-responsive for trivial 239 
reasons in order to elevate favoured tenderers; tender prices being leaked in exchange for 240 
payments; government officials abuse their administrative powers to award public contracts; 241 
and projects that are re-tendered in the absence of due diligence. The results also revealed that 242 
the contract implementation and administration phase is vulnerable to corruption with a score 243 
of 0.77 (mean = 3.84). Various malpractices occur during this stage of construction projects, 244 
including: approval of shoddy works by consultants; over-measurement of works by quantity 245 
surveyors; over-payment of contractors by corrupt officials; and kickbacks (Dorée 2004; 246 
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OseiTutu et al. 2010). These survey results illustrate that most industry stakeholders are 247 
actively engaged in various corrupt acts (refer to Tables 3 and 4).  248 
     249 
[Insert Table 2 around here]  250 
[Insert Table 3 around here]  251 
  252 
Regarding prevalence of the seven forms of corruption, Table 3 shows that kickbacks (mean =  253 
3.97) is the most prevalent, followed by bribery (mean = 3.91), collusion and bid-rigging (mean 254 
= 3.76), conflict of interest (mean = 3.63), fraud (mean = 3.41), fronting (mean = 3.22) and 255 
embezzlement (mean = 3.00). Kickbacks and bribes are often used to obtain contracts, or secure 256 
a professional appointment and failure to participate in this corrupt practice results in either 257 
unemployment or difficulties in executing the job if employed. The order of prevalence of these 258 
corrupt practices varies across countries; for example, Bowen et al.’s (2012) survey revealed 259 
collusive tendering and bid-rigging, fronting and kickbacks in South Africa.   260 
  261 
[Insert Table 4 around here]  262 
  263 
Table 4 reports upon the forms of corruption experienced and/ or witnessed by respondents. 264 
The analysis indicated that 46–81% of respondents had a personal experience of, or witnessed 265 
various corrupt acts – namely: conflict of interest (81%); bribery (78%); collusion and 266 
bidrigging (78%); kickbacks (77%); fraud (61%); and fronting (52%). These findings illustrate 267 
that the construction supply chain allows greater interactions among upstream (consultants and 268 
clients) and downstream (material suppliers, contractors and subcontractors) stakeholders. 269 
Construction and consulting companies and their executives develop relationships with 270 
government officials and both sides could exploit these for economic benefits (Jamie et al.  271 
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2009). Conflict of interest, involves the shared interest of consultants and the client on a project, 272 
the consulting engineer working on a project for both the contractor and client, and government 273 
officials awarding public projects to private firms in which they have financial interests (Bowen 274 
et al. 2007a). Some contractors may offer bribes to public officials and consultants in exchange 275 
for tender information to secure contracts. Embezzlement is the least experienced corrupt 276 
practice. This is probably because (public and government) officials often embezzle project 277 
funds without knowledge of other industry participants, hence they are not easily exposed to 278 
the general public.   279 
    280 
Participation in Corruption  281 
The respondents’ experiences regarding the parties involved in corruption were also explored 282 
(refer to Table 5). Public and government officials, who serve as clients for public construction 283 
projects, actively engage in corruption (mean agreement = 4.23 or index = 0.85). The next most 284 
corrupt stakeholder groups are contractors and sub-contractors, with a mean agreement score 285 
of 3.79 (or index = 0.76) and 3.90 (or index = 0.79), respectively. Public or government officials 286 
engage in corruption for personal gain while contractors and subcontractors perceive that 287 
winning contracts is more important than observing the rules of procurement or breaking the 288 
law in order to remain in business (Brown and Skitmore 2015; Chotibhongs and Arditi 2012). 289 
Government officials and contractors and subcontractors’ active involvement in corruption is 290 
attributed to their extensive involvement in the construction process (Bowen et al. 2007a). 291 
Thus, there is some government-contractor interaction which facilitates corrupt activities. The 292 
amount of time contractors devote in dealing with public/government officials is related to the 293 
extent of corruption (Svensson 2003; Jamie et al. 2009). The analysis further illustrates that 294 
professional stakeholder groups (quantity surveyors, project managers, engineers and 295 
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architects) are involved in corruption, as indicated by a reasonable level of consensus among 296 
the survey respondents.  297 
     298 
[Insert Table 5 around here]  299 
[Insert Table 6 around here]  300 
Respondents were also requested to indicate the forms of corrupt acts that industry stakeholders 301 
frequently engage in. The survey allowed multiple responses. Table 6 illustrates that 302 
government officials (clients) mostly participate in conflict of interest (22 responses), 303 
kickbacks (21 responses), tender rigging and collusion (18 responses), bribery (16 responses), 304 
and embezzlement (16 responses). These results augment and concur with the survey findings 305 
of Vee and Skitmore (2003) in Australia and instantiate the theory that conflict of interest is a 306 
major concern internationally. Table 7 shows specific corrupt activities of public officials 307 
witnessed or experienced by the respondents. There is a high consensus that they primarily 308 
award contracts for political gains (mean = 4.47); extort bribes as inducement for awarding 309 
contracts (mean = 4.26); leak information to preferred bidders in exchange for payments (mean  310 
= 3.82); and awarding contracts to family members or friends (i.e., conflict of interest) (mean 311 
= 3.74).   312 
  313 
[Insert Table 7 around here]  314 
[Insert Table 8 around here]  315 
[Insert Table 9 around here]  316 
  317 
Contractors are reported to be associated with bribery (21 responses), fraud (17 responses), and 318 
fronting (11 responses) to win tenders, thereby undermining any possibility for competition 319 
(refer to Table 6). Contractors frequently offer bribes in the form of gifts and payments to 320 
obtain government construction contracts (Doh et al. 2003; Gordon and Miyake 2001), or 321 
obtain government approval or permit for a profitable public contract (DeSoto 2000; Jamie et 322 
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al. 2009). In the latter case, construction firms are more likely to speed up approvals through 323 
corrupt payments (Martin et al. 2007). Table 8 further illustrates that contractors collude with 324 
other contractors, for example, to win contracts (mean = 3.70); produce fraudulent invoices 325 
(mean = 3.67); and manufacture fraudulent timesheets (mean = 3.58). Subcontractors were 326 
found to primarily engage in bribery (Table 6). The respondents have also experienced or 327 
witnessed acts similar to contractors (see Table 9) such as: production of fraudulent timesheets 328 
(mean = 3.58); and collusion with other subcontractors to dictate the market (mean = 3.36).   329 
  330 
Among the professionals, Table 6 shows that quantity surveyors are found to primarily engage 331 
in tender rigging and collusion, and kickbacks, followed by bribery and conflict of interest. 332 
Table 10 reveals that the respondents have experienced or witnessed quantity surveyors being 333 
involved in specific corrupt behaviours such as: working for both client and contractor on a 334 
project (mean = 3.26) which creates conflict of interest; delaying issuance of payment 335 
certificates to contractors (mean = 3.26); and deliberate under-payment of interim payments to 336 
contractors (mean = 3.24). These corrupt behaviours are in expectation of gifts and payments 337 
from contractors for personal gain.   338 
  339 
[Insert Table 10 around here]  340 
  341 
Facilitators of Corruption   342 
High political connections is considered to be the most important facilitator of corruption (mean 343 
= 4.28 or index 0.86 - refer to Table 11). This factor is important, because it facilitates secrecy 344 
in the award of public construction contracts in developing countries. The Bowen et al. (2012) 345 
survey reinforces this finding, reporting that the process of awarding construction projects in 346 
South Africa lacks transparency and accountability. Ghana is no exception; award of potentially 347 
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lucrative public construction contracts is shrouded in secrecy and lacks transparency (Osei-348 
Tutu et al. 2010).     349 
  350 
[Insert Table 11 around here]  351 
  352 
Excessive and reckless sole sourcing for public projects is also ubiquitous as indicated by a 353 
high consensus mean score of 4.06 (index = 0.81). Excessive and reckless sole sourcing 354 
eradicates competitive tendering and affords ample opportunities for malpractices particularly 355 
inflated prices. Respondents also agreed that a lack of commitment by contractors in addressing 356 
corruption in their activities also provides a platform for corruption (mean = 3.94). This may 357 
be explained by the profit motive of contractors and other professionals, and a lack of ethical 358 
standards in the construction industry. Many construction companies operating in the 359 
construction industry of Ghana lack ethical codes of practice and/ or do not enforce these codes. 360 
In addition, government and public officials do not have a clear code of conduct to check their 361 
behaviour in performance of their duties.   362 
  363 
Control of Corruption  364 
Efforts at controlling corruption start by an individual or organisation experiencing or 365 
witnessing corruption reporting it to the appropriate authorities or persons. Sohail and Cavill 366 
(2008) proposed that accountability initiatives could help to minimise corruption in 367 
infrastructure projects. Similarly, Le et al. (2015) asserted that anti-corruption strategies (e.g., 368 
rules and regulations, training, leadership, and sanctions) are key to curbing corrupt practices 369 
within public construction projects. However, several barriers that impede the reporting of 370 
corruption are apparent amongst respondents (refer to Table 12); the two highest rated being: 371 
fear of dismissal or imposition of an occupational penalty by the employer (mean = 4.42 or 372 
index = 0.88); and a concern that the ‘whistle-blower’ is not adequately protected and may be 373 
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exposed (mean = 4.38 or index = 0.88). Three other important barriers indicated by respondents 374 
were: lack of confidence in the national anti-corruption agencies and the judicial system (mean 375 
= 4.22 or index = 0.84); loyalty to friends and organisations (mean = 4.16 or index = 0.83); and 376 
a belief that no serious action will be taken (mean = 4.03 or index = 0.81).   377 
  378 
[Insert Table 12 around here]  379 
  380 
DISCUSSION  381 
Construction industry stakeholders are expected to discharge their duties devoid of corrupt acts 382 
and with honesty and fairness, in order to deliver value for money for public construction 383 
clients (Bowen et al. 2007b). Thus, the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) (Government 384 
of Ghana 2003) and ancillary codes of conduct promulgated by various construction industry 385 
professional bodies (GhIE, GhIS, GIA) invoke an expectation on government / public officials 386 
and construction professionals to observe high ethical standards and behaviours. The Act 663 387 
is underpinned by five themes relating to public procurement processes, namely: i) a 388 
transparent legal and institutional framework; ii) clear and standardized procurement 389 
procedures and standard tender documents; iii) independent control systems; iv) proficient 390 
procurement staff; and v) anti-corruption measures (Government of Ghana 2003; Osei-Tutu et 391 
al. 2010, p. 246). Therefore, government/public officials within client bodies, professional 392 
consultants and private sector firms are expected to adhere to procurement laws and 393 
regulations, carry out duties with fairness and competence and avoid or disclose conflict of  394 
interest.   395 
  396 
The general presupposition of the Ghanaian Government is that this legislative framework and 397 
auxiliary codes of professional conduct purge the construction industry of corruption – but this 398 
research points to the habitual use of corrupt activities. These findings support the assertions 399 
 18  
    
of previous studies in other countries (Brown and Skitmore 2015; Dorée 2004; Bowen et al. 400 
2012; Tabish and Jha 2011; CIOB 2006; Vee and Skitmore 2003). The prevalence of corruption 401 
is the result of widespread secrecy (or a lack of transparency), from high level political 402 
connections in the award of public construction projects, excessive and reckless sole sourcing 403 
of public contracts, and absence of commitment by contractors in addressing corruption. These 404 
factors have led to intense and unfair competition among professional consultants and 405 
contractors in winning government contracts in order to stay in business (Zhang et al. 2016; 406 
Doh et al. 2003). Unfortunately, such competition maintains high pricing because the motive 407 
is for economic survival rather than economic efficiency. This situation presents opportunistic 408 
corruption – construction and consulting firms resort to offering kickbacks and bribes to 409 
public/government officials in exchange for public contracts (see Table 3 and 5).        410 
  411 
The research findings indicated a high level of pathological corruption amongst government 412 
officials and contractors compared to other construction industry stakeholder groups. Several 413 
reasons include: top-level political connections coupled with excessive sole sourcing breed 414 
secrecy in awarding contracts; the complexity and huge costs of construction projects that 415 
provide opportunity to conceal procurement-related malpractices and their extensive 416 
involvement throughout the construction contract lifecycle – from project planning and design 417 
to contract close-out. As Jamie et al. (2009) observed, membership in, and support for, political 418 
parties serve as a vehicle for promoting willingness to engage in corrupt activities by ignoring 419 
legal proscription on corruption. Consequently, government and public officials are frequently 420 
identified as being inveterate fraudsters by awarding contracts to ‘dummy’ companies or family 421 
and friends of state officials/ politicians. They also abuse their positions of power and influence 422 
to advance political affiliations by using contract awards to extort funds for the ruling party, 423 
especially during elections (Bowen et al. 2012). The perceived high level of corrupt contractors 424 
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allows them to compete effectively, avoid becoming disadvantaged and/or insolvent, to get 425 
things done and to do business with government/public officials (World Bank Enterprise 426 
Survey 2013).   427 
  428 
The various corrupt practices and behaviours identified in this research emanate from improper 429 
market function (c.f. Dorée 2004) with concomitant late delivery of projects, sub-standard 430 
workmanship and late payment or non-payment of employees, suppliers and subcontractors 431 
costing more money to the industry stakeholders. Economic growth and social equity can be 432 
achieved by addressing market failures and ensuring a corruption-free society (United Nations  433 
2006; OECD 2006).   434 
  435 
Culture is a vehicle for corruption (Beets 2005; Husted 1999; Robertson and Watson 2004; 436 
Maingot 1994) and may partly explain widespread corruption in Ghana’s construction industry. 437 
In traditional Ghanaian contexts, traditions of gift-giving and gift-taking are ‘expressed in 438 
customary exchanges whose functions are primarily symbolic.’ Gift-giving involves various  439 
‘material and symbolic goods provided as part of the services due a chief [traditional ruler]’ 440 
(Le Vine 1975, p. 49). Wrath and Simpkins (1964) and Mends (1970) contend that these 441 
customary practices have been ‘abused’ (converted to reasons far removed from their 442 
traditional ones) within business environments, and this partly explains the widespread 443 
corruption in society today. For example, World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2013) found that 444 
businesses in Ghana are expected to give gifts to government procurement officials to secure 445 
public contracts. Gifts are used as a mechanism to improve the responsiveness of, and to 446 
enhance and maintain relationships with, government officials for present and future favourable 447 
contract opportunities.     448 
  449 
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Further, a strong tradition of familial ties in Ghana could explain the prevalence of corrupt 450 
behaviours. A government official’s decisions may be affected by family members or friends, 451 
and there is tendency to favour one’s ingroup (i.e., family and friends) in awarding public 452 
construction contracts (Husted 1999; Hooper 1995). This research found that government 453 
officials frequently engage in conflict of interest (Table 7) by awarding contracts to family 454 
members and/or friends. Officials of construction firms with familial ties to these government 455 
officials may engage in corrupt transactions to secure competitive advantage, favourable 456 
opportunities and contract terms (Jamie et al. 2009).  457 
  458 
Maingot (1994) indicates that certain aspects of social structures of some countries provide a 459 
tendency to resort to acts of corruption to attain socially approved status and/or personal gain.  460 
In some cultures, material success is paramount, with little regard to ethics (Gonzalez-Fabre, 461 
1996; Beets 2005; Husted 1999). Adinkrah (2016, pg. 40) notes that a consumerist ethos has 462 
engrossed the Ghanaian society, evident by an uncontrolled pursuit for material prosperity “and 463 
the obstentious display of opulence in the form of handsomely furnished mansions, luxury 464 
automobiles, electronics, clothes, jewellery ...” This focus on material prosperity is more likely 465 
to lead to a greater willingness of both government officials and construction professionals to 466 
engage in ill procurement transactions in the quest for material riches.     467 
  468 
Again, the prevalence of corrupt acts may be seen as a mechanism to avoid or minimise 469 
uncertainty (Husted 1999), regarding outcomes of contract awards at tendering and bid 470 
evaluation phases of project development. The research findings showed that corruption is 471 
widespread at both phases, and that contractors frequently offer bribes or pay kickbacks to 472 
government officials (see Table 6) to secure a more certain outcome of public procurement 473 
exercises. Rashid (1981) concludes that bribery minimises uncertainty in public utility services 474 
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contracting in developing countries. Government officials may cause delays and uncertainty in 475 
approving construction permits for potentially lucrative contracts, with the intention to obtain 476 
speed payments from contractors (Martin et al. 2007; DeSoto 2000).    477 
  478 
To the consternation of both government and the general public, corruption remains a major 479 
concern (CDD-Ghana, 2000; Mensah et al., 2003; Abbey, 2005). Strategies to control 480 
corruption are myriad and include: whistle-blowing facilities and effective protection of 481 
whistle-blowers; increased transparency in government procurement processes; internal audit 482 
and monitoring of public contracts; good governance and accountability; sanctioning corrupt 483 
individuals and companies; and effective implementation of codes of conduct within public 484 
and private organisations (Gordon and Miyake 2001; Osei-Tutu et al. 2010; Le et al. 2015; 485 
Tabish and Jha 2011; Sohail and Cavill 2008). An intricate network of political affiliations and 486 
the personal financial rewards that these offer may prove difficult to eradicate particularly 487 
because government officials are implicated. Nevertheless, and despite immense challenges 488 
ahead, concerted and prodigious effort by both government and industry would radically 489 
change the corruption culture within Ghana’s construction industry and in so doing, transform 490 
economic performance and concomitant prosperity.    491 
  492 
CONCLUSIONS  493 
This research presents evidence of widespread corruption within the Ghanaian construction 494 
industry; this is despite the Public Procurement Act and ancillary codes of conduct for industry 495 
professional bodies. Because corrupt officials within government represent the industry’s 496 
biggest and most prominent client, contractors are more concerned about placating these 497 
officials to secure business survival than observe procurement rules/ laws. These inextricably 498 
linked political-industry connections and the operating environment of construction projects 499 
restrict competitive pressure in the construction industry to yield poor performance. Based 500 
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upon a survey of construction industry practitioners, the most endemic corrupt practices were 501 
revealed to be: kickbacks, bribery, tender rigging and collusion, and conflict of interest which 502 
predominantly occur at bid evaluation and tendering phases of project development.   503 
  504 
The results hold practical implications for detecting and tackling corruption in the construction 505 
industry across developing countries. A major observation from this study is the ease with 506 
which corruption occurs (high incidence of corruption) in public infrastructure works 507 
procurement in Ghana. This situation is facilitated by high-level political connections in 508 
awarding contracts, the excessive and reckless sole sourcing for public contracts and 509 
contractor’s lack of commitment in tackling corruption. Addressing these challenges requires 510 
improvement in the transparency and accountability environment in public procurements 511 
throughout the project development phases, including a strict enforcement of the Public 512 
Procurement Act (Act 663). This will help to create an environment for fair competition, 513 
enabling contracts to be won and awarded on merit. Another critical issue to tackling corruption 514 
is to give priority to certain aspects of the Ghanaian culture/traditions that influence corruption 515 
in public procurements; these include gift-giving and gift-taking and strong familial ties.   516 
  517 
The results show that the strategies used by project stakeholders to engage in corruption are 518 
wide-ranging, including approving/awarding contracts for political and personal gains, leaking 519 
confidential information for payment (by government officials); collusion among contractors 520 
and sub-contractors, production of fraudulent invoices and timesheets (by contractors and 521 
subcontractors); and delayed issuance of payment certificates, deliberate conflict of interest 522 
situations (by quantity surveyors). The extant literature illustrates that these corruption 523 
strategies are equally applicable to other countries.     524 
  525 
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Successful implementation of anti-corruption measures is beyond the scope of the research 526 
reported herein. Hence, given the widespread of corruption, further research is needed to 527 
explore and develop appropriate anticorruption measures to address corrupt practices and 528 
behaviours. The research should also collaborate more closely with public and private sector 529 
organisations provided robust ethical controls and procedures can be implemented. Strategies 530 
to be explored should include adequate protection of whistle-blowers, tightened procurement 531 
procedures, use of codes of conduct and detection of corrupt activities. Controlling the 532 
influence of cultural and traditional practices on corruption in public infrastructure works 533 
procurements in Ghana is currently lacking, and further empirical investigation of its role in 534 
corruption is needed to provide a deeper understanding of corruption and improve efficacy of 535 
anti-corruption strategies.    536 
  537 
The research has some limitations. First, it is exploratory and does not consider any theoretical 538 
or philosophical approach to investigating corruption. Second, the work was based upon direct 539 
experiences of construction practitioners. Hence, hard facts and evidence of corruption are 540 
urgently required to develop and implement effective anti-corruption measures expediently. 541 
Third, the survey sample size was relatively small but adequate for an exploratory research that 542 
deals with a highly sensitive subject (Vee and Skitmore 2003; Tabish and Jha 2011). Future 543 
research will address these issues, and greater collaboration with industry and government will 544 
present the best opportunity to achieve success in this respect and engender much needed 545 
cultural change.    546 
  547 
Supplemental Data   548 
Table S1 Sample Questionnaire Template is available online on the ASCE Library (asce.org).  549 
  550 
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Table 1 Respondents’ background and experience in the construction industry   
Item   Category   Count  %  
Years of experience   1 – 10  0  0.00  
  11 – 20  7  20.00  
  21 – 30  23  65.71  
  Above 31  5  14.29  
  Total  35  100  
Job level  Director level    19  54.29  
  Senior management level   16  45.71  
  Total  35  100  
Affiliation  Construction company   14  40.00  
  Public sector agency/department   12  34.29  
  Professional consulting firm  9  25.71  
  Total  35  100  
Professional association  Ghana Institution of Surveyors (GhIS)  14  40.00  
  Ghana Institute of Architects (GIA)  11  31.43  
  Ghana Institution of Engineers (GhIE)  9  25.71  
  Not indicated  1  2.86  
  Total  35  100  
Job sector (profession)  Quantity surveying*   11  31.43  
  Engineering**  7  20.00  
  Project/Construction management***    8  22.86  
  Architecture and design****  9  25.71  
  Total  35  100  
 *Quantity surveyors; **Engineers; ***Project/Construction managers; ****Architects/designers  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 2 Prevalence of corruption in industry and project phases associated with corruption  
(a) How widespread is corruption?   Mean  Index  Standard deviation   
Prevalence of corruption   4.40  0.88   0.76  
         
(b) Project phases  Mean   Index  Rank   Standard deviation  
Bid evaluation   4.31  0.86  1  0.95  
Tendering   4.25   0.85  2  0.94  
Contract implementation and administration  3.84  0.77  3  0.62  
Project planning and design  3.03  0.61  4  1.07  
Contract close out (final account)  2.91  0.58  5  0.91  
 Likert sale: (a): 1 – 5 (strongly disagree to strongly agree); (b): 1 – 5 (never to very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
  
       Table 3 Prevalence of forms of corruption ta  
  
 
      Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Corrupt acts  
Kickbacks  
  Bribery  
Tender rigging and collusion  
  
Conflict of interest  
  Fraud  
Fronting  
  
Embezzlement  
Mean  
3.97  
3.91  
3.76  
3.63  
3.41  
3.22  
3.00  
Index  
0.79  
0.78  
0.75  
0.73  
0.68  
0.64  
0.60  
Rank  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
Standard deviation  
1.16  
1.07  
1.03  
1.16  
0.90  
1.14  
0.84  
  
  
  
  
        Table 4 Personal experience and/or witness of corruption  
  Conflict 
of interest  Bribery  
Tender rigging 
and collusion  Kickbacks  Fraud  Fronting  Embezzlement  
Yes: 1   25  25  25  24  17  14  13  
No: 2  6  
  
7  7  7  11  13  15  
Total   31  32  32  31  28  27  28  
Yes %   81   78   78   77   61   52   46  
No%   19   22   22   23   39   48   54  
Rank  1  2  2  4  5  6  7  
  
  
  
  
  
  
       Table 5 Industry participants to corruption     
Participants   Mean  Index  Rank  Standard deviation  
  
  
 
          Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Government officials  4.23  0.85  1  0.72  
Contractors   3.82  0.76  2  0.86  
Sub-contractors  3.79  0.76  3  0.99  
Quantity surveyors  3.57  0.71  4  0.87  
Material suppliers   3.55  0.71  5  0.86  
Project managers   3.49  0.70  6  0.84  
Professional architects/engineers  3.43  0.69  7  0.84  
Developers/investors  3.31  0.66  8  0.92  
  
 Table 6 Industry participants’ association with forms of corruption  
  
  
Government 
officials  
Developers 
/ investors  
Project 
managers  
Professional 
architects  
Professional 
engineers  
Quantity 
surveyors  Contractors  
Subcontractors  Material 
suppliers  Total  %  
Fraud  10  9  4  3  4  5  17  12  8  80  10.88  
Collusion and bid 
rigging  
18  5  11  10  15  18  9  9  4  104  14.15  
Embezzlement  16  1  8  6  3  3  7  7  4  62  8.44  
Fronting  7  6  5  6  4  3  11  8  8  61  8.30  
Bribery  16  11  15  16  18  15  21  17  15  167  22.72  
Kickbacks   21  9  20  16  18  17  14  12  13  155  21.09  
Conflict of interest  22  7  11  11  14  14  3  4  9  106  14.42  
Total scores   110  48  74  68  76  75  82  69  61  735    
%   14.97  6.53  10.07  9.25  10.34  10.20  11.16  9.39  8.30    100.00  
Rank  1  9  5  7  3  4  2  6  8      
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                 Table 7 Government officials’ involvement in corrupt activities   
Corrupt acts   Mean  Index  Rank   Standard deviation   
Approval/awarding contracts for political gain  4.47  0.89  1  0.65  
  
Extortion of bribes from contractors, sub-contractors or 
suppliers as an inducement for awarding of contracts  
4.26  0.85  2  0.70  
Leaking of confidential information to a bidder in 
return for payment or payment in kind, thereby 
giving the bidder unfair advantage  
3.82  0.76  3  1.01  
Awarding contract to a family member, friend or 
business, where there is conflict of interest  
3.74  0.75  4  1.09  
Reject qualified contractors, sub-contractors, or 
suppliers without valid reason  
3.61  0.72  5  1.01  
    Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
        
  
  
  
        
     Table 8 Contractors’ participation on corrupt activities   
Corrupt acts  Mean  
3.70  
Index  
0.74  
Rank   Standard deviation   
Collusion with other contractors in order to dictate the markets  1  1.09  
Production of fraudulent invoices  3.67  0.73  2  1.12  
  
Production of fraudulent timesheets  3.58  0.72  3  1.13  
Provision of false extra costs to a contract claim as a “negotiation 
margin” **  
3.55  0.71  4  1.23  
Employment of illegal workers  3.24  0.65  5  1.26  
Refusal to work with a subcontractors or supplier unless some 
benefit is provided to the contractor  3.21  0.64  6  1.01  
 **The claimant’s logic in including this margin may be that it believes that the opponent will attempt to reduce the claim, and so a 
sufficient   margin must be added to enable negotiations to arrive at the correct figure.  Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
           Table 9 Sub-contractors’ participation on corrupt activities  
 
Corrupt acts  Mean   Index  Rank   Standard deviation   
Production of fraudulent timesheets  3.58  0.72  1  1.13  
Collusion with other subcontractors in order to dictate the 
markets   
3.36  0.67  2  1.07  
Production of fraudulent timesheets  3.27  0.65  3  1.11  
Providing lesser standard of work rather than what was stated 
in the contract specification  
3.24   0.65  4  1.10  
Employment of illegal workers  3.06  0.61  5  1.20  
 
  
              Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 10 Quantity surveyors’ participation on corrupt activities  
Corrupt behaviours  Mean   Index  Rank   Standard deviation   
Deliberate delayed issuing of payment certificates to the contractor  3.26  0.65  1  1.02*  
Working for both the client and contractor on a project, creating a 
conflict of interest  
3.26  0.65  2  1.08*  
Deliberate under-payment of interim payments to the contractor  3.24  0.65  3  1.14  
Biased decision-making in the expectation of additional contracts from 
clients (such as withholding valid payments, or extension of time, or 
claims to which the contractor is entitled)  
3.23  0.65  4  1.10  
Willingness to issue improper payment certificates or approve invalid 
claims and extensions of time, due to fear of repercussion for 
negligence (e.g. over-measurement)  3.14  0.63  5  1.25  
  
Preparation of unfair final accounts, favouring the client   3.09  0.62  6  1.16  
Likert scale: 1 – 5 (Never to Very frequently); *When different factors have the same mean score, the highest rank is assigned to the factor with the least  
standard deviation  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 11 Facilitators of corruption in the construction industry Corruption 
facilitators  
Mean   Index  Rank   Standard deviation   
High political connections enhance secrecy in the award of public contracts   4.28   0.86  1  0.98  
Excessive and reckless sole sourcing for public procurement contracts breeds 
corrupt practices*  
4.06   0.81  2  0.97  
The lack of commitment by construction firms in addressing the issue of corruption 
in their mission statement contributes to the prevalence of corruption within the 
industry  
3.94   0.79  3  0.90  
The operating environment of construction projects provides opportunity to conceal 
corrupt activities  
3.88   0.78  4  0.96  
Private opening of tenders provides more opportunities for corrupt practices to occur by 
modifying the result during the tender adjudication period   
3.84   0.77  5  0.91  
  
The lack of accountability through the use of internal auditing on construction 
projects is a reason for the existence of corruption within the industry  
3.81   0.76  6  0.98  
Lack of transparency in awarding of contracts (no reason provided for unsuccessful 
bidders in a non-competitive procurement system)   
3.75   0.75  7  1.03  
The absence of high competition between locally-based foreign and Ghanaian firms 
promotes corrupt practices   
3.44   0.69  8  1.00  
 
*e.g., inflated cost prices  
Likert scale: 1 – 5 (strongly disagree to strongly agree)  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 12 Barriers to reporting corruption practices   
Barriers  Mean  Index  Rank  
Standard 
deviation  
Fear of dismissal (or other occupational penalty) imposed by your employer  4.42  0.88  1  0.70  
The perception that the ‘whistle-blower’ is not well protected and may be exposed  4.38  0.88  2  0.60  
No confidence in the national anti-corruption agencies and the judicial system  4.22  0.84  3  0.70  
Loyalty to friends or organisation prevents individuals from reporting any illicit activity  4.16  0.83  4  0.75  
A belief that it will be a waste of time as no serious action will be taken  4.03  0.81  5  0.90  
  
Do not want to be seen as a “whistle blower” syndrome (stigma)  3.94  0.79  6  0.90  
The fear of physical harm to one’s self and/or one’s family   3.81  0.76  7  0.95  
Do not know the reporting procedures to be followed  3.75  0.75  8  0.90  
Likert scale: 1 – 5 (strongly disagree to strongly agree)  
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The authors wish to thank the referees for their constructive comments and suggestions which 
aimed at improving the paper. Each individual comment has either been addressed or 
defended as appropriate (refer below) and a final file resubmitted for your consideration. Once 
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Reviewers’ Comments    Authors’ response   
All authors  
This manuscript was submitted as a Case Study. Does the 
reviewer think this is the appropriate article type?  To see 
descriptions of the article types, <a 
href="download.aspx?scheme=7&amp;id=28">Click 
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We thank the Reviewers for the 
agreement  
Reviewer #1: Yes. The author is using the correct 
article type.  
  
Reviewer #2: Yes. The author is using the correct 
article type.  
  
Reviewer #4: Yes. The author is using the correct 
article type.  
  
Reviewer #3: No. The author should revise as a 
Technical Paper.  
We believe that it is appropriate to 
present this research as a Case Study 
given its specific focus on a developing 
country.  
Reviewer #1    
This is a well written case study that addresses an 
important construction issue in developing countries.    
  
A copy of the questionnaire used for data collection needs 
to be added as an appendix to the paper to enhance reader 
understanding of the tabular data presented.    
The authors are delighted to read this 
comment - thank you.  
  
  
As recommended, we have also made 
available a copy of the questionnaire to 
enhance readers’ understanding of the 
tabular data.   
    
Reviewer #3  
This is a fine written paper, following the classical IMRaD 
methodology. The abstract is well written and so is the inner 
text.  
We thank the Reviewer for the 
comment.  
  
There are just couple of concerns before the paper could be 
recommending for final acceptance:  
  
We thank the Reviewer for the following 
comments.   
  
1. it would be interesting to use Transparency International 
findings on Ghana (incl. the global rank) and include it in 
this research - when giving the intro, but also discussing 
the results.  
We thank the reviewer for the comment.   
We have included Transparency 
International’s corruption index scores 
and ranks on Ghana in the Introduction 
(Lines 63 – 69) and in presentation of 
results (Lines 225 – 225). Figure 1 is also 
included to show trends in the scores 
and ranks over the last 10 years (2007 to 
2016)  
2. the research community would benefit from attaching the 
sample of the survey to the appendix, so it could be used 
in and compared with the other developing countries.  
We thank the reviewer for the comment.  
A copy of the Questionnaire is provided 
(uploaded).   
 
3. the tables 4 and 6 could be omitted. The text is more then 
grateful...  
Thank for the observation.  
Although the main text provides details 
of the results, inclusion of tables 4 and 6 
provide further details. For example, 
Table 6 indicates associations between 
various forms of corruption and industry 
stakeholders. As the text highlights only 
corrupt acts associated with government 
officials, Table 6 further informs the 
reader of various malpractices in which 
other stakeholders are involved in.     
4. the public procurement act is not put to referenced or is 
referred wrong.  
The Public Procurement Act is 
referenced where it first appears (in  
Discussion section) (Lines 385 – 386).   
5. the conclusions declared at ln 425-428 are a bit bold, 
considering the citation from 1975 (!?)  
We submitted that culture may explain 
the widespread corruption in Ghana’s 
construction industry. The point about 
gift-giving and gift-taking in the 
Ghanaian culture still holds in today’s 
cultural practices/traditions of the 
country. And therefore, our emphasis is 
on the abuse of these cultural practices 
in the business environment, which is 
supported by the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys (2013):  
  
“… businesses in Ghana are expected to 
give gifts to government procurement 
officials …Gifts are used as mechanism 
to improve the responsiveness of, and to 
enhance and maintain relationships, 
with government officials for present 
and future favourable contract 
opportunities” (see Lines 446 – 449).      
  
The above violates the traditional 
purpose of gift-giving and gift-taking in 
Ghana.   
  
Hence, the declaration is still valid 
within the Ghanaian context regarding 
corruption.   
  
6. explain how to impose such anti-corruption measures (ln 
490-492). This is important for the readers      
Thank you for the comment.   
  
Given the scope of this paper, and space 
limitation imposed by the Journal, 
implementation of the anti-corruption 
measures mentioned is recommended 
for further research. This aspect will 
appear in a subsequent publication as 
part of the research project being 
undertaken by the researchers.   
  
We submit that (Lines 528 – 531):  
  
“Successful implementation of 
anticorruption measures is beyond the 
scope of the research reported herein. 
Hence, given the widespread of 
corruption, further research is needed 
to explore …”.   
  
Just an advise... When using the Likert scale it's better if the 
even scale would have been used. Hence the respondents  
We thank the reviewer for the advice, it 
is accepted.   
 
would have been averted from using the neutral and middle 
value.  
  
 
Lastly, this paper is clearly written in a research fashion and 
should not be classified as case study.  
  
We believe that it is appropriate to 
present this research as a Case Study 
given its specific focus on a developing 
country.  
Reviewer #4    
This type of research is needed to make these practices and 
their extent of use known to the society. It also serves as an 
alert to locals and foreigners doing business in Ghana.  The 
research can also inform actions that need to be taken to 
combat corruption.  
  
We are grateful to the Reviewer for the 
comment – thank you.   
  
The paper is very well organized and easy to read. The tables 
are necessary but Figure 1 could be removed, as it is not 
informative.  
Thank you for the comment.   
  
Figure 1 is removed from the 
manuscript.   
  
  
The methodology is explained but it is not clear how the 
main sections of the questionnaire were defined and/or how 
they directly relate to a review of the literature reviewed. It 
would be useful to know how the authors singled out specific 
questions and whether or not they were reviewed or 
pretested.   
  
The literature is well covered and integrated throughout the 
paper, and could be better used to explain the method as 
well.  
Thank you for the comment and the 
authors are pleased to read that the 
literature is well covered.   
  
The key sections of the questionnaire 
were based on the literature and guided 
by the overall objectives of the research. 
The main aspects covered in the current 
paper are: prevalence and forms of 
corruption, parties involved in 
corruption, enablers or facilitators of 
corruption, and barriers to reporting 
corruption. Further, the questionnaire 
was reviewed and modified by the 
research team to ensure its suitability for 
the study Ghanaian environment, 
particularly the construction industry.  
Hence, the authors report that:  
  
Lines 219 – 220: The results are 
structured to iteratively report upon 
key sections of data collected from the 
questionnaires.  
  
The research methods are well 
explained, connecting to relevant 
literature. We describe our overall 
approach to the study, highlighting the 
identification and selection of 
experienced construction practitioners 
as survey respondents (Lines 186 – 212).   
  
The results need to be evaluated to check their significance, 
from an Statistics standpoint. The tables present the 
frequency of responses and the analysis is shallow in terms of 
what could be done with this dataset. Which types of 
correlations can be verified in the dataset. Are there bias in 
the responses?   
  
Or certain participants tended to answer in one way or 
another. For instance, contractors pointing to problems with 
owners, and owners pointing to contractors. There seems to 
be a lot of blame assigned to public servants/officials, 
however, were they given a chance to fill this questionnaire? 
Is this a one-sided assessment of the situation? There needs 
to be some comment on that.  
The authors thank the reviewer for the 
comment.   
  
This paper – which emanates from a 
larger-scope, ongoing corruption 
research – is exploratory, based on 
direct experiences of construction 
practitioners/professionals. This helps 
to build and inform the next stage of the 
research project. Also,  
advanced/sophisticated statistics are not 
employed in the analysis of data due in 
part to the small sample size (this 
limitation is acknowledged in the 
‘Conclusions’ section). Despite their 
simplicity, the methods of analysis used  
 
  
 are appropriate for a study of this genre, 
and have been used in previous studies 
(e.g., Tabish and Jha 2011; Bowen et al.  
2007).   
  
We are of the view that the respondents 
were fair and drew on their lived 
experiences of corruption and 
professional knowledge; recall that the 
respondents were experienced 
construction professionals from private 
construction companies, public sector 
agencies/departments and professional 
consulting firms, and with affiliations to 
the construction industry professional 
bodies in the country (see Table 1: GhIS, 
GIA, and GhIE)). Hence, there was no 
one-sided assessment of corruption 
situation. Drawing on the professional 
knowledge and lived experiences of 
corruption of the professional 
respondents is a major strength of this 
paper. We have commented on this:  
  
Lines 193–195: In order to avoid bias in 
the survey responses, respondents were 
selected from private construction 
companies, professional consulting 
firms and public sector 
agencies/departments (refer to Table 1). 
This selection strategy was adopted … 
and to guarantee credible and balanced 
feedback.  
  
   
  
The discussion could be organized in subtopics to make the 
points clearer and more impactful and also make a more 
directly link to what is presented in the conclusions.  
We thank the reviewer for the comment.  
  
We structured the paper as follows. The 
survey results are structured into four 
broad subheadings under ‘The Survey 
Results’, namely:  
• Prevalence and forms of corruption  
• Participation in corruption  
• Facilitators of corruption  
• Control of corruption   
  
This structure helps to report upon key 
sections of data collected from the 
questionnaires (see Lines 219 – 221).   
  
Following the above, we provide a 
discussion that integrates ad reflects 
results of the four key subheadings.   
  
  
  
  
The conclusions should reflect the results of the paper. How 
specific results should be addressed, instead of some blanket 
statements about the need for ethics reform or regulation. 
Address results separately, as well as address the results that 
point to the most frequent problems/barriers/facilitators.  
  
We thank the review fort the comment.  
  
We have revised/re-written the 
Conclusions section so that the results 
are reflected. Blanket statements are 
removed or revised. Further research is 
recommended to address relevant issues 
that are beyond the scope of this  
 research, including development of 
anticorruption strategies and the role of 
cultural and traditional practices in 
facilitating corruption in public 
procurements (Lines 501–529; 534 – 
538).   
  
Editor’s comments     
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Journal of Management in Engineering to publish your work. 
I have read the paper and the comments of the reviewers. 
The reviewers have recommended revise and resubmit the 
manuscript. Based on my own reading of the paper and the 
comments of review team and AE, I agree with the reviewers 
to invite you to revise your manuscript.  During the revision 
process, I strongly recommend that you conduct a thorough 
literature review on the subject to discuss your work's 
importance/significance and clearly explain why your work is  
appropriate for the diverse readership of Journal of 
Management in Engineering.  
   
We thank the Editor for the interest in 
our research.   
  
We have responded to the reviewers’ 
comments, and where necessary, further 
clarification is provided.   
  
In our concluding remarks, we state the 
study’s potential contribution to practice 
and transparency and accountability 
environment in public procurements, 
and the role of local cultural/traditional 
practices in the tackling corruption in 
the construction industry.    
Please incorporate all reviewers' comments thoroughly and 
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response to reviewers' comments for full re-review.  Thanks 
for your interest in the Journal of Management in 
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manuscript from you. The reviewer comments are listed 
below.  
  
We have responded to the reviewers’ 
comments point-by-point as shown in 
this Response sheet.   
  
As requested by the reviewers, we have 
uploaded a sample of our 
questionnaire template under  
‘Supplemental Data’ section:  Table S1 
Sample Questionnaire Template is 
available online on the ASCE Library 
(asce.org).  
  
Associate Editor’s comments    
Associate Editor: Thanks for your submission to JME. The 
paper was reviewed by three experts who acknowledged its 
value. However, the same reviewers also suggested various 
remarks to hone the quality of the paper. The authors should 
address these comments in their revision.  
We thank the AE for the interest in 
this paper.   
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